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Abstract 
In August 2016, drivers delivering meals in London after being booked via the platforms ‘deliveroo’ 
and ‘UberEATS’ made headlines by challenging working practices in the gig-economy through collec-
tive industrial action. Dissatisfaction resulted from extremely low levels of pay as well as a new pay-
ment calculation system being introduced without consultation. This indicates that the ‘gig-econ-
omy’, though arguably contributing to ‘smart cities’, may not always constitute the smartest solution 
for those serving within it. However, it also highlights that collective industrial action is far from 
structurally impossible for workers in the ‘gig-economy’, even though management of labour relies 
on anonymous and automated micro-management through internet platforms and apps. Indeed, 
collective organisation may seem the smartest solution for upgrading the gig-economy for its work-
ers. This article develops an original contribution to the interface of smart technology in the gig-
economy, collective labour rights, and EU competition law. We identify that EU competition law as 
interpreted by the Court of Justice would hinder collective organisation of those serving the gig-
economy and develop a comprehensive re interpretation which allows adaptation of EU competition 
law to smart employment markets. 
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competition law 
                                                          
* A more encompassing version of this paper has been presented at the 3rd Labour Law Research Network 
Conference (LLRN Toronto 2017, where Andrea Gideon’s participation was enabled by the LLRN travel fund) 
and the 24th Conference of Europeanists ‘Sustainability and Transformation’ (Glasgow 2017). We are grateful 
for written feedback on the conference paper by Albert Sanchez-Graells and Luca Ratti, to Joanna Unterschütz 
for convening the panel on ‘Collective bargaining transformation for sustainability’ for the CES, for informal 
feedback by many of the discussants for both conferences, including Eva Brameshuber, Stein Evju, Julia Lopéz 
Lopéz and Tonia Novitz, and for the support of the editors of the special issue. The usual disclaimer applies.   
 2 
I. Introduction 
Notwithstanding the lack of a clear definition of ‘smart cities’, the smart city is built on smart uses of 
information technology (IT)1 and internet-based platforms for its governance,2 utilising data created 
by citizens to improve efficiency. Smart usage of IT and e-communication are also the base of the 
“gig-economy”,3 a term we use as an umbrella for several internet-based methods of allocating ser-
vices to those consuming them. As smart cities, the gig economy utilises information technology for 
data management in order to improve work efficiency. The gig-economy and smart cities are thus 
closely related,4 not least as the gig-economy is markedly prevalent in areas of particular relevance 
for urban life: individual transport (crucial for cities in regions with under-developed public transport 
especially), short term housing, domestic services including cleaning, child-care, mobile meals, el-
derly care and pet-care, and delivery services competing with or replacing public postal services.  
In utilising the potential of enhanced communication and data processing offered by information 
technology, smart cities and the gig-economy harbour the risk of enhancing control5 and disempow-
erment.6 Labour law critique of the gig economy7 exposes the recurrence of extremely casual, pre-
carious and exploitative working conditions reminiscent of the early industrial age.8 However, the 
use of information technology also offers the potential of a collaborative world of work and life 
where technology serves the enhancement of self-determination,9 conjuring the vison of smart cities 
establishing a ‘commons-based’ gig-economy for public uses.10  
For realising this positive potential of both the gig economy and the smart city, the question in how 
far gig-workers are able to shape their conditions of work in order to achieve humane standards is 
crucial. Within the sphere of employment law, the right of workers to organise collectively provides 
the opportunity to achieve just that. Authors embracing the opportunities of the gig-industry tend to 
suggest that employment law needs to adapt to the new demands of the gig world.11 However, the 
                                                          
1 (Cocchia, 2014; Glasmeier & Christopherson, 2015; Almirall, et al., 2016). 
2 (Almirall, et al., 2016) p. 142. 
3 We use the term “gig-economy” in line with the recently agreed ILO report on non-standard work (ILO, 2016) 
instead of terms such as ‘sharing economy’ and ‘collaborative economy’, which may suggest a solidarity-based 
operation of business per se (on the fallacy of the terms see also (Kenney & Zysman, 2016) p. 62). 
4 See for example (Almirall, et al., 2016), who discuss the “sharing economy” as a potential basis for smart city 
developments.  
5 (Sadowski & Pasquale, 2015) 
6 (Cardulllo & Kitchin, 2017) 
7 In lieu of even attempting to provide full coverage of the digital economy, here is a subjective choice: (Aloisi, 
2016; Degryse, 2016; Sundararajan, 2016; Valenduc & Vandrame, 2016; de Stefano, 2016; Hatzopolous & 
Roma, 2017; Ratti, 2017); a useful literature review is provided in (Schmid-Drüner, 2016). 
8 Finkin (2016) highlights historical parallels to early capitalism, while Eurofund (2015) locate the phenomenon 
in the wider context of casualisation. Sadowski and Pascale (2015) criticise the “resurrection of early capitalist 
piecework in the guise of the gig economy”.  
9 Sadowski & Pascale (2015)demand a new dimension of the right to the city, while Cardullo & Kitchen (2017) 
adopt Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation to the world of new technology, developing the requirements 
for empowering citizens to become collective co-decision makers by utilizing the emancipatory potential of 
technology.  
10 (Almirall, et al., 2016, pp. 141-151)  
11 (Taylor, et al., 2017; Sundararajan, 2016) 
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same authors embrace the value of giving gig-workers (or micro-entrepreneurs) voice in their work-
ing environment.12 Beyond detailed discussion of social protection for gig workers,13 there is as yet 
scant discussion on how the options of collective bargaining rights for gig-workers are impacted 
upon by competition law.  
This article aims to fill that gap, by analysing the barriers posed by EU competition law for collective 
labour rights of gig-workers. Again, this is reminiscent of the early industrial age where workers, per-
ceived as free from any protection, were subjected to new legislation criminalising their collective 
organisation (then termed “combination”).14 Similarly, today’s gig-workers, if viewed as independent 
entrepreneurs, are barred from collective bargaining by competition law. In today’s EU, the com-
plexity of the situation is enhanced by legislative competences meandering between national levels 
(which retain the competence for regulating the law of industrial conflict) and EU levels (where legis-
lative competence for collective organisation of employers and employees is shared between the EU 
and its Member States, while EU competition law is an exclusive EU competence). We argue that 
there is a case for all gig-workers, independent of formal status, to be able to avail of collective bar-
gaining rights, and consequently challenge the desirability and necessity of enforcing competition 
law against them. Using EU competition law as an example for competition law regimes more gener-
ally, we develop an original re-interpretation of its categories, arguing that in the European Union 
with its enhanced socio-economic model gig-workers can and should be granted realistic opportuni-
ties to bargain collectively and to threaten their employers with collective action. 
The paper will proceed as follows: We will first sketch very shortly the basic features of the gig-econ-
omy and distinguish two forms of organisation. Subsequently, we will summarise the extent to 
which collective bargaining is excluded from the application of EU competition law under the case 
law as it stands currently. This will be followed by a conceptual discussion of whether collective or-
ganisation and bargaining can be of use for micro-entrepreneurs of the gig-economy. Based on the 
rationale for such strategies, we will develop arguments for aiming to preserve scope for gig workers 
to improve their working conditions collectively in future case law.  
II. Work in the gig-economy – Between app-based match-making for 
real-world work and crowd-sourced IT-work  
The gig-economy is mainly characterised by the extensive use of IT for the distribution, allocation, 
evaluation, grading and payment of work. The literature distinguishes two main organisational mod-
els as archetypes; app-work and crowd work.15  The first archetype, epitomised by “Uber”, uses tech-
nology to match customers with persons delivering work in the real world, such as offering a ride 
(cab services), delivering items (courier services), caring for children, the elderly or pets, gardening, 
or other craft services. The second archetype consists of ICT based work, such as designing a web 
page, typing text or numbers into forms (e.g. for billing services), contacting customers, or even 
working the “apps” for app work. IT is used in order to source this work from an anonymous group 
of “bidders”, who are referred to as the crowd, hence the name crowd sourcing.  
                                                          
12 (Taylor, et al., 2017, p. 77) 
13 See for example (Forde, et al., 2017) with numerous references. 
14 See, for example, the British Combination Act of 1799 as cited in (Aspinall & Smith, 1959, p. 749). 
15 See, for example, (Cherry, 2016; ILO, 2016). 
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Work of the first archetype can appear as an IT platform matching those seeking a service (e.g. indi-
vidual transport) with an independent provider (e.g. the Uber taxi). However, typically the platform 
“app” provides more functions. In the case of Uber, it determines the price for the specific ride, with 
the help of an algorithm that emulates market mechanisms and demands higher prices at busy 
times. Uber also encourages rating of drivers, and thus operates a system of constant evaluation and 
grading, linked to the threat of de-activation if ratings are too low. Finally, the payment of the ser-
vice is channelled through Uber: the rider does not pay the driver, but instead the price for the ride 
is cashed in electronically, a profit margin for Uber is deducted and the remainder transferred to the 
driver – if the system works correctly. Basically, Uber offers a transport system without registered 
drivers, at a price much lower than taxi rides and with wages below those taxi drivers achieved be-
fore Uber became established. Systems offered under different names and with some variation in-
clude Lyft (another taxi service), Deliveroo (a food delivery service) and Citylift (a bicycle couriering 
service).16  
The second archetype, crowd-working,17 creates virtual bidding platforms for services, to be deliv-
ered electronically, via the internet. These can be services requiring low or high qualification – the 
relevant platforms comprise translation services, the writing and/or evaluating of bills, constructing 
or maintaining web pages, but also providing legal or other professional advice. Often, but not al-
ways, crowdsourcing goes along with the splitting up of work processes in micro processes. Crowd-
working platforms may entail instruments to evaluate crowd workers. Frequently they allow the one 
who invites bids, or the delivery of work, to reject work, which means that time spent on providing a 
service remains unremunerated. Typical tradenames for low qualified work, including micro-pro-
cesses, comprise Amazon Turk, Rapidworkers, Microworkers (the last two mainly on computer-
based tasks) and those rumoured to crowd-source higher qualified work include Axiom for lawyers.18 
The construction of this type of web platform may be closer to a brokering system than “app work”. 
Frequently, the service provider and the worker will not have direct contact, because the administra-
tion of bidding, delivery and payment is organised via the web page. In contrast to “app work”, there 
may be more cases where the web site provider only streamlines the offers and demand instead of 
generating the service.  
The two archetypes represent points on continuum. Therefore, not every single working arrange-
ment will fall neatly into either category, but may be somewhere in between and it is not impossible 
that yet other forms may arise in the future. Since it is not our main purpose to contribute to the 
growing literature on gig worker classification, this brief summary may suffice. However, as will be 
shown below, the categorisation of the service providers as workers or otherwise is relevant for the 
question whether gig workers can engage in collective bargaining without clashing with EU competi-
tion law. In this regard the differentiation between the two archetypes plays a certain role: app-work 
(the matching of customers and workers for physical tasks such as cleaning, care provision, individ-
ual transport or delivery) seems more prone to being classed as an employment relationship, as is 
                                                          
16 For a more extensive analysis of different models of app work see (Cherry, 2016; Aloisi, 2016). 
17 See on this (Berg, 2016; Aloisi, 2016), see also (Finkin, 2016), for a selective comparison see (Waas, et al., 
2017). 
18 Their webpage explicitly acknowledges that some of the providers may be employees (Huws, et al., 2016).  
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also witnessed by case law. Cases have proliferated in the United States19 and, recently, UK employ-
ment tribunals having classed Uber drivers20 as well as cycle deliverers for City Sprint21 as employees. 
While crowdsourcing has also spawned litigation,22 this litigation has less frequently resulted in es-
tablishing employee status for those servicing the gig industry. Notwithstanding considerable inten-
sity of exploitation in the crowd sourcing industry, the fragmentation of tasks under this type of gig-
work also leads to the option for workers to engage with a larger number of customers. As long as 
the crowd-sourcing platform does not limit this form of multiple customer servicing, the gig worker 
may be able to secure a degree of independence from any individual customer. Accordingly, r some 
of these workers may be truly self-employed persons.23 The conclusion to be drawn for our purposes 
is thus that a considerable number of gig-workers could be classed legally as truly self-employed.24 
III. EU competition law and collective bargaining – the case law 
The ECJ case law constitutes one example for approaches to competition law perceiving inherent 
tension between collective labour rights and competition law concepts such as the bans on cartels 
and on abusing a dominant market position. First, collective agreements could be viewed as limiting 
competition between individual workers as well as, in cases of multi-employer bargaining (i.e. if sev-
eral employers or employer associations are party to a collective agreement), collective agreements 
may be classified as a collusion (i.e. a cartel) between undertakings to not compete on the price of 
labour.25 Second, multi-employer bargaining, in particular if coupled with the option to extend a col-
lective agreement for general application, may contribute to the creation of institutions (e.g. social 
security institutions) holding a dominant market position, which may then be fined on the grounds 
of abusing such a dominant position.  
The subsequent sub-sections analyse under which circumstances the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (ECJ) considers labour agreements as anti-competitive collusion or cartels (1) or as lead-
ing to an abuse of market dominance (2). We will then turn to the position of micro-entrepreneurs 
more specifically (3).  
                                                          
19 Cherry (2016). 
20 Aslam and Farrar v Uber B.V, Uber London Ltd, Uber Britannia Ltd, 28 October 2016 Case No 2202550/2015, 
appeal dismissed by the EAT on 10 November 2017 (UKEAT/0056/17/DA. Uber unsuccessfully sought to have its 
action joined with the Pimlico Plumbers case, which is heard before the Supreme Court at the time of writing 
(see Jane Croft, Financial Times, 19 February 2018). In a hearing before ACA, Deliveroo drivers accepted that 
they do not enjoy worker status for the purposes of collective bargaining (https://www.gov.uk/government/up-
loads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/663126/Acceptance_Decision.pdf). 
21 Dewhurst v Citysprint UK Ltd, 17 January 2017, Case No 2202512/2016, the appeal was not pursued by the 
employer, who only changed conditions for the claimant in response to the ruling (see https://www.guard-
ian.com/business/2017/nov/15/citisprint-employment-rights-courier-minimum-wage-holiday-pay). 
22 Christopher Otey, et al. v. CrowdFlower, Inc., et al., Case No. 12-5524 which ended in a settlement. See for a 
summary Lexis Legal News, 'California federal judge approves modified settlement in 'crowdsourcing' wage 
suit' Lexis Legal News (10th August 2015) <https://www.lexislegalnews.com/articles/1555/california-federal-
judge-approves-modified-settlement-in-crowdsourcing-wage-suit> accessed 6th November 2017. 
23 For a similar result see (Ratti, 2017). 
24 (Aloisi, 2016; Hatzopolous & Roma, 2017; Ratti, 2017; Taylor, et al., 2017). 
25 For more detail on this, see (Schiek & Ulber, 2016). 
 6 
1. Collective agreements as anti-competitive collusion (“cartel”)?  
The ECJ’s first ruling26 on collective bargaining and competition law arose in criminal proceedings 
against ship-owners using non-recognised dock workers in Ghent harbour in order to avoid paying 
the wages owed to recognised dock workers, whose working conditions were ‘governed by collective 
labour agreements concluded […] and made mandatory by Royal Decree’.27 In deciding whether 
these collective labour agreements collided with EU competition law, the Court refused to class 
dockers as undertakings, because they concluded fixed term employment contracts with ship own-
ers.  
26 It must therefore be concluded that the employment relationship which recognised 
dockers have with the undertakings […] is characterised by the fact that they perform 
the work in question for and under the direction of each of those undertakings, so that 
they must be regarded as 'workers' within the meaning of [Article 45 TFEU] […]. Since 
they are, for the duration of that relationship, incorporated into the undertakings con-
cerned and thus form an economic unit with each of them, dockers do not therefore in 
themselves constitute 'undertakings' […]. [emphasis added] 
27 It should be added that, even taken collectively, the recognised dockers in a port 
area cannot be regarded as constituting an undertaking. 
Therefore, Becu established that employees in an employment relationship are not undertakings for 
the purposes of EU competition law due to being incorporated into their employers’ organisation. 28  
Somewhat puzzlingly, the Court did not refer to Becu in the landmark Albany29 and two parallel 
cases,30 decided only five days later, which initiated a line of case law establishing a limited exclusion 
of collective bargaining from Article 101 TFEU. While these cases were widely discussed academi-
cally,31 the Commission did not pursue the application of competition law to collective agreements 
beyond this limited exclusion. Considering that work is becoming ever more precarious, this consti-
tutes a missed opportunity for extending collective representation and collective bargaining, with 
particular relevance for the gig-economy. It is thus worthwhile to recount the development of this 
case law in order to identify the risks for emerging collective activities of gig-workers. 
The three cases of September 1999 concerned collective agreements establishing social security in-
stitutions made compulsory for the relevant sector by administrative order. The employers rejected 
compulsory affiliation to the collectively agreed schemes, and challenged these obligations with ref-
erence to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (prohibition of cartels and of abusing a dominant market posi-
tion respectively). The ECJ failed to recognise a general competition law immunity of collective 
                                                          
26 Four years earlier, the Van Schijndel case(C-430-1/93, judgment of 14th December 1995) touched upon the 
competition law compatibility of a social security scheme for physiotherapists similar to that at stake in the 
Albany case discussed below. However, for procedural reasons the Court did not discuss the substance of this 
problem.  
27 Case C-22/98 Becu para 25 judgment of 16th September 1999. 
28 See also (Jones & Sufrin, 2016, p. 125; Wish & Bailey, 2015, p. 93). 
29 Case C-67/96 Albany. 
30 C-115-117/97 Brentjens, C-219/97 Drijvende Bokken. 
31 E.g. (Bruun & Helsten, 2001), more sources in (Schiek & Ulber, 2016), on specific application to the “gig-
economy” see (Lougher & Kalmanowicz, 2016). 
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agreements, in contrast to Becu. Yet, it neither followed AG Jacobs’ extreme proposal that only col-
lective agreements on core employment conditions (not including occupational pension funds) 
should be excluded from the ban on cartels. Instead, the ECJ reasoned that while “certain re-
strictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements between organisations representing 
employers and workers, […] the social policy objectives pursued by such agreements would be seri-
ously undermined if management and labour were subject to Article [101(1) TFEU] when seeking 
jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and employment.”32 The Court recalled that 
Articles 152, 154 TFEU supported cooperation between Member States in relation to collective bar-
gaining rights as well as encouraging dialogue between management and labour at EU level, poten-
tially leading to agreements,33 and inferred from “an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty as 
a whole which is both effective and consistent that agreements concluded in the context of collec-
tive negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of such objectives must […] be re-
garded as falling outside the scope of Article [101(1) TFEU] [emphasis added].” In order to profit 
from that exclusion, collective agreements must fulfil two conditions: 
1. they result from “collective negotiations between organisations representing employers and 
workers”34 and 
2. have the purpose to “jointly adopt measures to improve conditions of work and employ-
ment”.35 
The ‘Albany formula’ was repeated verbatim in the two parallel cases, and confirmed and specified 
subsequently.  
The first criterion will be considered in more detail below, as it is the main difficulty for excluding 
collective agreements in favour of gig workers from EU competition law. The second criterion, relat-
ing to the purpose of the agreement, has been less problematic due to a broad interpretation36 by 
both the ECJ and the EFTA Court. The ECJ held in van der Woude37 that subcontracting a collectively 
agreed occupational health scheme did not undermine the Albany exclusion because “such a limita-
tion would constitute an unwarranted restriction on the freedom of both sides of industry”. Simi-
larly, the EFTA Court, when applying the Albany exclusion to the equivalent provisions of the EEA 
Agreement in a case concerning a collectively agreed pension scheme found that ‘“conditions of 
work and employment” must be interpreted broadly’,38 while cautioning that ‘more circumstantial 
detail’ might disqualify a collective agreement for the exception.39 The 2nd Albany criterion was again 
tested in the AGR2 case in 2011,40 with the argument that a scheme not allowing to apply for non-
affiliation would also not allow more favourable insurers for employees. This argument was rejected, 
since the purpose of providing health care cover suffices for the collective agreement to pursue the 
                                                          
32 Paragraph 59 
33 Paragraphs 55, 56 
34 Paragraph 62 
35 Paragraph 59 
36 (Nordling, 2015, p. 42). 
37 C-222/98 van der Woude. 
38 E-8/00 Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions para 53. 
39 Ibid para 55.  
40 C-437/09 AG2R Prevoyance.  
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purpose of improving working and employment conditions. The limits of the second Albany condi-
tion were thus far only met in the FNCBV case, concerning an agreement between slaughterhouses 
and small farmers on prices for slaughtering animals and the suspension of imports after farmers’ 
blockades of lorries in connection with the mad cow disease. The General Court found that ‘the 
agreement does not relate to measures for improving conditions of work and employment, but to 
the suspension of beef imports and the fixing of minimum prices for certain categories of cows’.41 In 
summary, the Court generally interprets the second Albany criterion broadly and, in particular, 
found that it was fulfilled by the social security funds based on collective agreement in the 1999 
cases.  
2. Collective agreements and abuse of a dominant market position 
Even if not classing a collectively agreed social security scheme as anti-competitive under Article 101 
TFEU, the Court did not hesitate to apply Article 102 TFEU to the institutions which were providing 
the schemes.42 In the AG2R case, the Court did see the potential of the institution not being an un-
dertaking (and thus outside the scope of the competition provisions) due to its high degree of soli-
darity, but left the final determination to the national court. In Pavlov43 the scheme was considered 
an undertaking with a dominant market position, though the Court did not find any abuse. In the 
other cases, the schemes were accepted as exempted under Article 106 (2) TFEU as services in the 
general economic interest.   
While, therefore, in the end, none of the social security schemes constituted infringements, this was 
either because one of the criteria of Article 102 TFEU had not been met or due to the exemption un-
der Article 106 (2) TFEU. It was, significantly, not because there was an exclusion from Article 102 
TFEU per se such as the ‘Albany exclusion’ from Article 101 TFEU. Depending on the specific 
schemes, institutions set up by collective agreement could thus still potentially infringe Article 102 
TFEU irrespectively of whether or not the agreement itself fell under Article 101 TFEU or not. 
3. Collective bargaining for micro-entrepreneurs and EU competition cases 
The question whether the trade union signing the collective agreement represents workers (1st Al-
bany criterion) is particularly relevant in recognising collective bargaining rights of micro-entrepre-
neurs. While this was no particular problem in the three 1999 cases (Albany, Brentjens and Drijvende 
Bokken), it was discussed more thoroughly in subsequent case law, which we analyse in this section.  
In the Pavlov case, the Court refused to recognise an agreement setting up a pension fund for self-
employed medical consultants as collective agreement, because the consultants were not employ-
ees. The agreement was nevertheless not considered as infringing Article 101 (1) TFEU because it did 
not appreciably prevent, restrict or distort competition (i.e. it was de minimis).44  
                                                          
41 T-217/03 and T-245/03 FNCBV para 100. 
42 The EFTA Court (see above note 38) had not assessed this.  
43 C-180-184/98 Pavlov. 
44 Ibidem. 
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In FNCBV, 45 the General Court also found that the first Albany condition was not met. Disregarding 
the French Labour Code,46 it considered the farmers as undertakings,47 among other things because 
they did not work under the direction of the slaughterhouses.48 As this aspect was not part of the 
appeal to the ECJ, the role of a statutory expansion in national law of the notion of workers for the 
purpose of collective bargaining was not clarified.  
More recently, the limitation of the first Albany condition was tested before the Court in the FNV 
Kunsten case,49 which also took the case law into more central areas of collective bargaining such as 
determining remuneration. The Dutch competition authority had published a position that a collec-
tive agreement on payment for substitutes for orchestra musicians was infringing competition law 
because it also applied to those substitutes, who were hired under a contract of services, not of em-
ployment. FNV Kunsten, a trade union, challenged this position paper as it had led the employer or-
ganisation and the other trade union involved to terminate the agreement and to refuse to renegoti-
ate pay for the self-employed substitutes. In his opinion, AG Wahl had rejected the authority of col-
lective agreements to cover micro entrepreneurs whose economical position is comparable to that 
of workers. Yet, Wahl floated the idea that a collective agreement fixing wages for the self-employed 
could still qualify as aiming to improve working conditions of employees, if it aimed at protecting 
workers from “social dumping” [sic] by preventing contracts with independent musicians for lower 
remuneration.50  
The Court took another route by focusing on who would qualify as a worker/labour in the sense of 
the first Albany condition. Repeating that the notion of workers under EU law may differ from that 
under national law, the Court relied on its case law in the field of free movement of workers51 and 
equal pay for equal work irrespective of gender52 as well as on the previously discussed case Becu. 
Arguably, it developed a specific notion of worker for the purposes of competition law, which deter-
mines whether micro-entrepreneurs qualify as undertakings, which are subject to competition law 
or as workers which are excluded from competition law coverage when bargaining collectively. The 
Albany exclusion from Article 101 TFEU is thus not accepted for those micro entrepreneurs who can-
not be considered as falsely self-employed under this definition. These micro entrepreneurs would 
still be subject to the control of competition authorities when organising collectively to improve 
their working conditions.53 The Court’s definition reads: 
33 […] [A] service provider can lose his status of an independent trader, and hence of an 
undertaking, if he does not determine independently his own conduct on the market, 
but is entirely dependent on his principal, because he does not bear any of the financial 
or commercial risks arising out of the latter’s activity and operates as an auxiliary within 
                                                          
45 T-217/03 and T-245/03 FNCBV para 100. 
46 Paragraph 58 
47 Paragraph 48-50 
48 Paragraph 100. 
49 C-413/13 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media ECLI: EU:C:2014:2411. 
50 Paragraph 76-78 of his opinion. 
51 Case C‑ 46/12 N. EU:C:2013:97, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited.  
52 Case Allonby C‑ 256/01, EU:C:2004:18, paragraph 71. 
53 A more optimistic assessment is provided by (Klebe & Heuschmid, 2016, p. 182) and hinted at by 
(de Stefano, 2016). 
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the principal’s undertaking  (see, to that effect, judgment in Confederación Española de 
Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio, EU:C:2006:784, paragraphs 43 and 44).  
[…] 
36 It follows that the status of ‘worker’ within the meaning of EU law is not affected by 
the fact that a person has been hired as a self-employed person under national law, for 
tax, administrative or organisational reasons, as long as that persons acts under the di-
rection of his employer as regards, in particular, his freedom to choose the time, place 
and content of his work (see judgment in Allonby, EU:C:2004:18, paragraph 72), does 
not share in the employer’s commercial risks (judgment in Agegate, C‑ 3/87, 
EU:C:1989:650, paragraph 36), and, for the duration of that relationship, forms an inte-
gral part of that employer’s undertaking, so forming an economic unit with that un-
dertaking (see judgment in Becu and Others, C‑ 22/98, EU:C:1999:419, paragraph 26) 
[emphasis added]. 
This reasoning aspires to forge a specific notion of workers for competition law purposes which in-
cludes those who are wrongly classed as self-employed. While the Court refers to working under the 
direction of another, highlighting dependency as the criterion traditionally used to establish worker 
status in labour law,54 it also makes reference to more economic criteria such as sharing of commer-
cial risk, and being integrated into the organisation of another. In adapting labour law to the needs 
of the modern, interconnected economy, the criterion of economic dependency has been discussed 
widely. However, the FNV Kunsten ruling seems to require organisational integration and in addition 
economic dependency. If those criteria are cumulative, the definition will not cover all gig workers: 
while most of them are economically dependent, many are not organisationally dependent. They 
would have to be classed as self-employed. Any collective agreements negotiated on their behalf 
would risk being subjected to the control of EU competition law.  
IV. Safeguarding collective labour rights for gig-workers - making 
smart cities smarter? 
In this section, we first discuss the rationale for granting gig-workers collective bargaining rights and 
argue that the opportunity of organising collectively could remove a structural barrier for making the 
smart city an equitable place to work and live.55 This is followed by a short section why outlawing 
collective bargaining of gig-workers under competition law is particularly problematic. In the remain-
der of the section we develop arguments for a reinterpretation of EU competition law. These re-in-
terpretations would remove the threat of being fined and prosecuted by competition authorities for 
collective bargaining in favour of gig-workers. It would thus enable  gig workers to organise and to 
voice demands for fairer working conditions adapted to the specific characteristics of the sector. Ini-
tially we submit that the ECJ case law as it stands already provides avenues for a more economically 
oriented interpretation of the notion of workers. We then develop a more substantial reinterpreta-
                                                          
54 See on this (Davidov, et al., 2015; Waas & van Voss, 2017, pp. 44-52) 
55 See on the connection above, text surrounding footnotes Error! Bookmark not defined. to 10. 
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tion which would, ideally, exclude collective agreements from the scope of Article 101 (1) TFEU. Al-
ternatively, we also propose arguments that would allow interpreting Article 101 (1) TFEU in a way 
that no infringement would be found through a collective agreement.  
1. Rationale for collective bargaining of gig workers 
Generally, features of work in the gig-economy contribute to pressure on gig-workers to become 
more and more productive, which may lead to spiralling working hours inversely related to increase 
in earnings. Both crowd and app-workers, in particular if denied the protection of employment law 
and social insurance, can be classed as part of the new precariat.56 As these micro entrepreneurs 
only trade in their personal labour, the paradox observed on employment markets would apply to 
them as well: the workers of industrial times, never able to accrue sufficient assets to allow them to 
bridge periods without work, were driven into a murderous competition by this economic incentive 
to undercut others by accepting lower wages. This would lead to an expansion, instead of a contrac-
tion of labour made available. This again induces a negative spiral of competition, which collective 
bargaining was designed to interrupt, and indeed to convert. In the case of the gig workers, the eco-
nomic incentives are complemented by effects of the computerised evaluation and rating instru-
ments, which encourage  workers to underbid (if crowd working) or to outperform each other (if app 
working). 57   
This chimes with the earliest justification of collective bargaining: it sought to correct the structural 
imbalance of labour markets to the detriment of workers by allowing them to combine as well as to 
take collective industrial action.58 The economic dependence of gig-workers underlines the currency 
of these market-based justifications for collective bargaining rights fort those who offer their ser-
vices in the gig-industry: as individuals, without having accrued sufficient assets to allow them to 
bridge periods without work, they are relatively powerless against those requiring their services. This 
is independent from their classification as employees, workers or self-employed micro-entrepre-
neurs.59 What is more, despite counter-evidence by high profile court cases around classification as 
workers, some gig-workers seem to appreciate the status of being self-employed:60 the related inde-
pendence gained (even if illusionary) is viewed as one of the advantages of gig work. Accordingly, 
retaining status-independence while collectively bargaining would be an advantage.  
Next to the market-based justifications for collective bargaining, human rights guarantees of collec-
tive bargaining (e.g. Articles, 12 and 28 Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union) rest 
on more fundamental deliberations. The right to combine and engage in relation to working condi-
tions also empowers citizens to take political engagement from the narrow realm of the traditional 
public sphere to the wider realm of the market place. Participatory citizenship thus extended to the 
market place as a form of social citizenship61 also suggests that securing humane working conditions 
through self-determination of workers is superior to relying on protective state legislation. Collective 
                                                          
56 This is also raised as a critique of smart cities, due to their reliance on gig-work, see for example (Sadowski & 
Pasquale, 2015) 
57 See with some empirical evidence from the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Sweden (Huws, et 
al., 2016). 
58 (Hickel, 2007) (Kaufman, 2010/11) (Reichold, 2010) (Stützel, 1979) (Schiek & Ulber, 2016). 
59 On this distinction see above footnotes 20-22. 
60 (Taylor, et al., 2017, pp. 74-76) 
61 See on this (Schiek, 2017, pp. 345-350). 
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bargaining as joint regulation based on these additional justifications goes beyond pressurising for 
just wages and working times, and encompasses establishing a working environment facilitating the 
actual enjoyment of fundamental rights more generally in the work place.  
These justifications for collective bargaining derived from the need for persons to self-govern ac-
quire a specific urgency in the gig-industry. Whether its appwork or crowdwork, techniques for 
building trust in the anonymous person with whom the service recipient connects are pivotal for 
their success. These techniques require workers to provide personal information at every corner and 
allow for constant customer ratings which may be demeaning, causing emotional stress, but still un-
changeable. Maintaining some boundaries around personal life becomes a regulatory challenge 
which app- and crowd-workers can better master collectively. Securing data protection and a realis-
tic private sphere constitute examples of regulatory needs that can be addressed by collective bar-
gaining, complementing legislation if it applies or, in the case of the gig-economy, filling gaps left by 
legislation.  
Further, the fast-paced gig economy makes accruing savings for ill health, times of low demand for 
work or when the “gigger” needs to prioritise other tasks such as childcare or further education, dif-
ficult. Even from within the gig economy, a discussion has started on how to provide portable secu-
rity systems which reward the flexibility of working on changing platforms or with different apps in-
stead of deterring from diversifying and moving.62 Collective bargaining as a regulatory technique 
has the advantage of allowing rules tailored to the needs of sectors in this regard. Indeed, in the 
early stages of industrialisation the mutualisation of risks of micro-entrepreneurs not yet recognised 
as workers constituted a viable form of pre-collective bargaining.63 
At the same time, specific features which the gig-economy shares with smart city may render collec-
tive organisation difficult: the reliance on technology allows working and engaging without personal 
contact, thus leading to efficiency gains by individualisation and reduction of face to face communi-
cation. While this may be typical for other forms of precarious employment as well, it is enhanced by 
IT-based work. On the other hand, gig-work also offers specific opportunities to contact workers: 
web based services that can adapt to the small windows of time left in the day of a gig-worker, who 
is relying on information technology for a living, might be the key.64 While gig workers may embrace 
individuality, they could still appreciate services65 such as training for professional qualifications, in-
duction to ways of avoiding giving up more privacy than is necessary for being successful in gig-work 
or general ways of managing time in the gig-economy. Even those sceptical of trade union represen-
tation and other traditional employment law stress the value of web-based forms of organisation of 
self-employed workers.66  
                                                          
62 (Forde, et al., 2017; Taylor, et al., 2017) 
63 (Cella, 2012). 
64 The platform http://faircrowd.work/ , by the German IG Metall and the Swedish Unionen, with input by the 
UK Independent Workers Union, the Austrian Trade Union Congress and an US American trade union for gig-
workers is a first step towards this, see also (Klebe & Heuschmid, 2016; Körfer & Röthig, 2017) 
65 On the general relevance of the service function of trade unions see, e.g., (Ewing, 2005). 
66 See (Balaran, et al., 2017, pp. 57, 67), promoting coregulation and government funded cooperative plat-
forms supporting workers, and (Taylor, et al., 2017, pp. 75-77), culminating in unspecified Workertech solu-
tions. 
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There are thus good arguments to use collective bargaining as a regulatory technique in the gig-in-
dustry, alongside wider reasons to provide options of engagement and self-governance more ade-
quate for modern smart cities than state regulation. We argue that such activities would suffer dis-
proportionally if subjected to the control of competition law. EU competition law is enforced by a 
network of specialised administrations, which react fast and flexible potentially imposing considera-
ble fines. The judicial review mechanisms are geared to the needs of large corporations, and would 
fast deplete the resources of the initially small organisations of micro-entrepreneurs in the gig indus-
try, and even of traditional trade unions. This would obstruct emerging collective bargaining struc-
tures, although these very structures would be well suited to introduce standards of fairness allow-
ing the gig-industry and smart cities to live up to ideals allured to by notions such as “sharing econ-
omy”. For example, ring-fencing agreements, consisting of promises by “giggers” to each other not 
to engage any app or a crowd-working platform not agreeing to certain minimum prices or minimum 
data protection would risk attracting the wrath of the competition authorities. This is evidenced by a 
recent ECJ case following a decision by a national competition authority to fine a professional organi-
sation of geologists because they recommended minimum fees for their self-employed members.67 
Similar risks would be encountered by the “workertech” solutions proposed in the UK if these offer 
collaborative platforms for self-employed gig-workers enabling them to “navigate the challenges of 
the modern economy”,68 as well as by the collaborative regulation and cooperative organisations 
supported by the RSA report. 69 If those new organisations would agree the creation of portable ben-
efit platforms with owners of apps and crowd-platforms,70 these agreements may be found to vio-
late simultaneously prohibitions of cartels and abuse of a dominant market position,71 which again 
could result in higher fines than just for finding an infringement of one article.  
2. Changing the argument in case law  
In developing new ways for the ECJ to change its case law on the relation of competition law and col-
lective bargaining in the light of the EU’s constitutional values,72 we propose a way to overcome the 
dilemmas outlined above. While the case law has not yet referred to the changes demanded by the 
gig economy, there are a number of formal anchoring points for progress, which can be developed 
further.  
a) A functional interpretation of the notion of “worker” for the purposes of competition 
laws 
Developing a functional notion of “worker” for the purpose of competition law would constitute one 
option to safeguard collective bargaining in the gig-economy as a sector characterised by precarious-
ness and a high proportion of micro-entrepreneurs. While labour lawyers also debate new models of 
defining worker and employment status,73 this is not our theme and neither do we attempt to de-
                                                          
67 Case C-136/12 Consiglio nazionale dei geologi and Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato. 
68 (Taylor, et al., 2017, p. 76) 
69 (Balaran, et al., 2017, p. 57) 
70 Ibidem  
71 See discussion above section III. 
72 (Schiek, 2015).  
73 See (Taylor, et al., 2017, pp. 74-79; Waas, et al., 2017)  
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cide the dispute on whether the flexibility of the labour law definition of worker and employee sta-
tus is a weakness74 or a strength due to its capacity to adapt to new developments, technological or 
otherwise.75 Instead, we consider whether defining the notion of worker in specific ways for the pur-
poses of competition law would contribute to enabling gig-workers of all categories to engage in col-
lective bargaining.  
So far, there is no ECJ case law on the classification of gig-workers. The Court’s first ruling on 
“Uber”76 concerned the question whether Uber is a transport service under Article 2(2) Directive 
2006/123 or a service in the information society under Directive 2000/31, which was decisive for the 
question whether Spain could require registration before operation. AG Spzunar considered that an-
swering the question whether Uber offered a brokering platform or a transport service required a 
decision on whether Uber controlled its drivers, which he argued was the case.77 The Court followed 
its AG, stating that “Uber exercises decisive influence over the conditions under which that service is 
provided by those drivers”, including determination of the “maximum fare by means of the epony-
mous application” (…) as well as “the quality of the vehicles, the drivers and their conduct”, con-
nected with the power to exclude drivers.78 This would indicate that Uber drivers are under the di-
rection of someone else for a certain period of time and receive remuneration, and would thus be 
qualified as workers under ECJ case law. The assessment of worker status in the app-model of gig 
work might thus be similar to the assessment under national laws.79  As under national laws, not all 
those contracting with “apps” would be classed as workers, and these considerations would not ap-
ply to the crowd-model of gig work at all. Accordingly, a relevant section of services in the gig-econ-
omy; in particular under the crowd model will be delivered by genuinely self-employed persons.  
It is thus worthwhile proposing an expansion of the criteria the Court has chosen for defining the no-
tion of worker, as confirmed in FNV Kunsten. Under that definition a worker works under the direc-
tion of another. However, the lines dividing self-employed and employed workers become more 
blurred when it comes to economic independence and the bearing of commercial risk: for example, 
the mere fact that someone is paid in a share of the commercial success of his or her employer does 
not defy his or her worker status, although this form of remuneration relocates the commercial risk 
to the worker.80  
Also, the Court in FNV Kunsten as well as in Becu pointed to the relevance of the worker being incor-
porated into the undertaking of the employer for the time of the contract. This relates to another 
doctrine for the scope of application of competition law, the single economic unit doctrine: competi-
tion law only applies to relations of those undertakings, which actually compete with each other on 
                                                          
74 That is the view of the Taylor report.  
75 See for such a conclusion, from a comparative law perspective (Waas & van Voss, 2017) 
76 C-434/15 Elite Taxi. 
77 Opinion of 11 May 2017 ECLI:EU:C:2017:364, paragraph 44. While the case did not concern competition law, 
AG Spzunar did indicate that if Uber would merely facilitate matching, it would probably infringe EU competi-
tion law (paragraph 62). 
78 Grand Chamber judgment of 20 December 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:891, paragraph 39 
79 See above section II. 
80 The Court referred to case 3/87 Agegate for this line of argument. 
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the market. While nowadays this line of case law is mainly relevant for conglomerates of undertak-
ings,81 the Court has, in earlier cases, also considered the relationship between a self-employed 
agent and the principal as an example where EU competition law does not apply because both form 
one economic unit.82 By contrast, publicans, whose pub was leased to them by the brewery, and 
who were only allowed to sell that brewery’s beer, were viewed as sufficiently independent eco-
nomically to not form an economic entity with the brewery. Accordingly, a collective agreement be-
tween the publicans and the brewery was subject to EU competition law.83 When and in how far the 
single economic unit doctrine can be applied to individuals to determine whether they are part of 
another undertaking thus remains somewhat unclear. 
Overall, this case law invites us to redefine the dividing line between those service providers to 
whose collective bargaining activities competition law never applies (as per Becu) and those whose 
collective agreements may be classed as cartels or abuse of a dominant market position. The former 
would encompass those formally self-employed persons who form an economic unit with their main 
trading partner, while not working under their direction as with an employer. The case law presently 
demands that the trading partner also assumes (most of) the commercial risk. In the gig-economy 
(as well as in other sectors engaging in precarisation) multinational companies and other employers 
endeavour to shift the commercial risk onto the economically dependent self-employed persons. We 
would suggest that a truly economic approach to the notion of worker would recognise that this 
shifting of risk is an expression of economic dependency on the part of the worker or micro-entre-
preneur. Those contractors unable to shift the risk individually to their counterpart would be ena-
bled to avail of collective bargaining techniques in order to create a fairer market place for all, and 
thus enhance the legitimacy of the gig economy.  
All this means that the first condition of the Albany exclusion should be rephrased through a func-
tional interpretation of the notion of undertaking in EU competition law. This would support an ex-
clusion for all collective bargaining processes aimed at overcoming economic dependency of eco-
nomically dependent service providers, irrespective from whether they are self-employed or not. 
This would go well beyond the FNV Kunsten case law, as it would become unnecessary to class the 
micro-entrepreneurs as falsely self-employed. The change would, however, build on the definition of 
a worker developed in FNV Kunsten. As mentioned, the Court in FNV Kunsten required – in line with 
earlier case law – that a worker must not assume the employer’s commercial risk.84 However, shift-
ing the commercial risk of the providers (such as Uber) to the freelance workers constitutes a central 
characteristic of app-work as well as of crowd work. Similar to the notion of worker for competition 
law purposes developed above, a focus on commercial/economic dependence instead of on risk 
(personal dependence) thus constitutes a way forward for determining which agreements would be 
excluded from Article 101 (1) TFEU. This would not only be adequate for the crowd and app work, 
but also for other forms of non-standard work. Furthermore, it would be in line with the single eco-
nomic unit case law: if the gig –worker is commercially dependent on the platform, she would usu-
ally not be able to act independently, and thus be integrated in the platform unit. Therefore, it is not 
sufficient for the platform operator to formally shift the commercial risk to the crowd- or app-
                                                          
81 For an overview see (Odudu & Bailey, 2014). 
82 Cases 40-8, 50, 54, 56, 11, 113-4/73 Suiker Unie, paragraph 539. 
83 23/67 Brasserie de Haecht. 
84 See above section III 3. 
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worker. Instead, collective agreements of persons who are economically dependent, for example be-
cause they do not have an organisation sufficiently large to allow them to diversify to more than 3 or 
4 platforms, remain excluded from Article 101 (1) TFEU.  
b) Auxiliary roads: collective labour agreements to avoid adverse competition by self-
employed workers and ancillary restraints  
There is also another possibility to exclude collective agreements from the scope of Article 101 (1) 
TFEU, similar to what was floated by AG Wahl in the FNV Kunsten case. He suggested accepting the 
competition immunity of a collective agreement in favour of independent contractors if the trade 
union involved seeks to protect their worker members through an anti-social dumping strategy. This 
would mean that trade unions can demand to include tariffs for independent contractor for such 
posts which are also filled by workers. Especially for the gig-industry, this would protect the newly 
won collective bargaining rights from negative impact deriving from divisions within those servicing 
the gig-economy. A partition of these will be independent contractors who work in the crowd or on 
the app as a hobby and are not dependent on the earnings. Gig workers and their trade unions could 
bargain for tariffs binding these actors, although they are not commercially dependent.   
If a collective bargaining agreement was to fall under Article 101 (1) TFEU, the Court would still have 
the opportunity to interpret that article in a way that the agreement would not be seen as anti-com-
petitive. If the Court would, for example, not automatically assume an agreement on wages as an 
object restriction, the effects of the agreement could be assessed more broadly. For example, argua-
bly, low pay for gig-worker could drive other undertakings out of the market, which ultimately would 
lead to less competition. Although the General Court excluded the notion of a rule of reason under 
Article 101 (1) TFEU,85 the Court and General Court have sometimes conducted a broader analysis.86 
Our proposal thus could be reconciled with existing case law.87  
Furthermore, and more importantly, the Court itself has accepted in case law decided around the 
time of Albany, Breentjes and Drijvende Bokken that there could be ancillary restraints in agree-
ments which do not in themselves have the object or effect of restricting competition. The Wouters 
case, on a clause in the regulations issued by the Dutch Bar association, had to deal with the ques-
tion whether professional rules of conduct prohibiting firms consisting of both solicitors and ac-
countants would conflict with competition rules. The Court found that this is not the case because 
the “consequential effects of restricting competition” were “inherent in the pursuit” of other objec-
tives which were at the heart of the professional organisations’ purpose.88 This could equally be an 
adequate instrument to allow a more principled argument around justification from Article 101(1) 
TFEU in favour of collective agreements. Collective bargaining, resulting in agreements and under-
pinned by credible threats of collective industrial action, are necessary in order to allow workers to 
achieve acceptable working conditions in a self-organised way. If structures of a sector, such as the 
                                                          
85 T-112/99 Métropole 
86 For an overview see (Jones & Sufrin, 2016, p. 271 seq). 
87 See similar with regards to environmental protection and suggesting that the net competitive effects of an 
agreement could be considered at the Article 101 (1) TFEU stage, while then other benefits could be consid-
ered at the Article 101 (3) TFEU stage (Monti & Mulder, 2017, p. 644 seq). 
88 Case C-309/99 Wouters [2002] ECR I-1577, paragraph 97, confirmed in case C-519/04P Meca-Medina [2006] 
ECR I-6001 paragraph 45. 
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gig-economy, should be addressed, it also seems preferable to recover multi-employer bargaining in 
the form of multi-platform bargaining.89 This argumentation seems to fit neatly with the areas in 
which the Wouters case law has been applied in that it usually concerned public goods and areas of 
state ‘support for self-regulation’.90 
Of course, there would also be other possibilities in which a collective agreement could be consid-
ered as not infringing Article 101 (1) TFEU. As mentioned, the Court held in Pavlov that the agree-
ment on assigning self-employed medical practitioners to a healthcare fund did not have an appre-
ciable effect on competition within the sector.91 Yet, these would seem more incidental to the spe-
cific case.  
c) Avoiding competition law hurdles for collective bargaining in the gig-economy 
Combining a re-interpretation of the notion of worker specifically for competition law with a func-
tional re-interpretation of the Albany exclusion constitutes a convincing and compelling route to 
avoid collective labour agreements from being captured by Article 101 TFEU. This interpretation 
frees collective bargaining from the supervision by competition authorities, which would clash with 
the autonomy of collective bargaining. Nevertheless, the other routes, though less satisfactory, also 
would achieve some progress. The re-interpretation of collective agreements as not having the ob-
ject or effect to hinder competition despite some potential ancillary restraints along the Wouters 
case law would present the next preferable option.   
V. Conclusion 
It has become a truism to state that the gig-economy poses challenges for labour law and, in particu-
lar, for collective bargaining. However, the role of EU competition law in compounding these chal-
lenges has received limited attention. While the narrow approach of the Court on exempting collec-
tive labour agreements from coverage of EU competition law has been criticised in literature, its spe-
cific impact on the gig economy has not been thoroughly analysed. The FNV Kunsten ruling has pro-
posed a wide notion of worker, based on a functional reading of the organisation of work. Yet, it re-
mains focused on organisational dependence, resulting in qualifying many gig-workers, especially 
crowd workers, as self-employed. The Court’s reluctance to protect collective bargaining rights of 
self-employed workers from the wrath of competition law thus threatens the emerging collective 
bargaining structures in the gig-economy specifically. 
This article addresses the lack of academic debate in this field and proposes a re-interpretation of EU 
competition law based on an analysis of the interface of smart technology in the gig-economy and 
EU competition law. EU guarantees of collective labour rights and the need to preserve the Euro-
pean Union’s enhanced socio-economic model demand that gig-workers’ opportunities to bargain 
collectively and to threaten their employers with collective action should not be compromised by 
                                                          
89 See for a similar argument (Kovacs, 2017, pp. 101-102) in relation to telework. 
90 (Monti & Mulder, 2017, p. 646 seq). 
91 However, the case law on appreciable effects (de minimis) has suffered in relevance from the Expedia ruling 
of 2012 (case C-226/11 Expedia - ECLI:EU:C:2012:795), since the Court no longer recognises agreements which 
have the object of limiting competition. Whether this threatens collective bargaining agreements, depends on 
whether any potential hindrance of competition would be regarded as object restriction or effect restriction 
which may go back to whether one focuses more on the human rights or more on the market related justifica-
tions of collective bargaining.  
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subjecting any resulting collective labour agreements to competition law control. We propose sev-
eral routes to achieve this aim, expanding various anchors in case law and AG opinions to achieve a 
comprehensive adaptation of EU competition law to smart employment markets. Using a competi-
tion-law specific notion of workers, which should focus on economic criteria, in combination with 
recognising a functional exclusion of collective bargaining agreements from EU competition law by 
expanding the “Albany exclusion” emerges as the most promising road. This original solution can be 
anchored in past developments of the Court’s case law. Our approach thus constitutes a realistic 
way forward and a genuine opportunity to avoid clashes between competition law and collective la-
bour rights.  
Beyond the issues it causes for a particular collective agreement and the workers involved, the po-
tential clash between EU competition law and collective bargaining in the gig-economy also endan-
gers the emerging transnational trade union activities in the sector. Furthermore, it limits the op-
tions for national legislation extending collective bargaining rights to gig-workers and other marginal 
independent contractors given that state action can partly equally be challenged under the competi-
tion provisions. Revising the limiting doctrine of the Court of Justice in this field is thus relevant to 
the future shape of the gig-economy as well as the adaptation of labour law to its demands. This ar-
ticle has not only demonstrated the necessity to argue in favour of such changes, but also proposed 
a solution.  
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